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Abstract 
For decades, the Codes of Fair Information Practice have served as a model for data privacy, 
protecting personal information collected by governments and corporations. But professional data 
management standards such as the Codes of Fair Information Practice do not take into account a 
world of distributed data collection, nor the realities of data mining and easy, almost uncontrolled, 
dissemination. Emerging models of information gathering create an environment where recording 
devices, deployed by individuals rather than organizations, disrupt expected flows of information in 
both public and private spaces. We suggest expanding the Codes of Fair Information Practice to 
protect privacy in this new data reality. An adapted understanding of the Codes of Fair Information 
Practice can promote individuals’ engagement with their own data, and apply not only to 
governments and corporations, but software developers creating the data collection programs of the 
21st century. To support user participation in regulating sharing and disclosure, we discuss three 
foundational design principles: primacy of participants, data legibility, and engagement of participants 
throughout the data life cycle. We also discuss social changes that will need to accompany these 
design principles, including engagement of groups and appeal to the public sphere, increasing 
transparency of services through voluntary or regulated labeling, and securing a legal privilege for 
raw location data. 
I. Introduction 
For decades, the Codes of Fair Information Practice have served as a model for data privacy, 
protecting personal information collected by governments and corporations (Waldo, Lin, & Millett, 
2007). The principles originally set forward by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare in 1973 demand notice of data collection, choice and consent, access for data subjects, 
integrity and security, and enforcement and redress (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, 1973). Governments and corporations through the United States and Europe have widely 
adopted and adapted these principles for privacy protection over the ensuing 35 years. New 
attempts to deal with the proliferation of mobile and web-based data often rely on finessing these 
principles and clarifying authority for data protection among corporate and government bodies 
(Chenok, 2009; Clarke, 2000; Connolly, 2008; Information Security Awareness Forum, 2009). 
But professional data management standards such as the Codes of Fair Information Practice 
do not translate well to a world of distributed data collection, nor the realities of data mining and 
easy dispersal. Consider the case of mobile personal sensing: an emerging form of distributed personal 
data collection (Eagle, 2008; Eisenman et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2009). Mobile personal sensing 
harnesses mobile phone capabilities, such as location awareness, image capture, motion sensitivity, 
and user input, for personalized discovery and community exploration. Current design initiatives 
enable individuals to use their phones to collect and respond to personal data about their habits, 
routines, and environment. Networks of phones could become technological platforms for 
individual analysis, medical research, or advocacy, helping a community make a case through 
distributed documentation of a problem or need.   
To illustrate the data collection possibilities and challenges of mobile sensing, we use the 
example of the Personal Environmental Impact Report (PEIR), a mobile sensing application 
developed by our research center that tracks location data to give individuals feedback on their daily 
interaction with their environment.1 Using GPS and cell towers, a small piece of software running 
on users’ phones records and uploads their location every few seconds. Based on these time-location 
                                                 
1 See http://peir.cens.ucla.edu/ to learn more about PEIR and experiment with demonstration data. 
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traces, the PEIR system can infer participant activities (walking, biking, driving, riding the bus) 
throughout the day. The system maps the combination of location, time, and activity to regional air 
quality data and weather data to estimate personal carbon footprint and exposure to particulate 
matter. In PEIR, recording a participant’s location throughout the day enables more accurate and 
previously unavailable information about environmental harms a person faces, and the harms she 
creates (Min Y. Mun et al., 2009).  
Individuals and groups harnessing phones as sensing systems pose a number of challenges to 
information privacy. While mobile sensing enables new forms of participatory research and 
discovery, such systems also create dispersed and massive databases of individuals’ locations, 
movements, images, sound clips, text annotations, and even health data. Sometimes these data are 
collected by institutions (mobile carriers, health care providers, insurers, Google) following Codes of 
Fair Information Practice. But increasingly, this data is shared among networks of amateur 
enthusiasts.2 In addition, mobile sensing data may be quite granular (e.g. thousands of GPS points or 
accelerometer readings), making these data more difficult for an individual to comprehend than 
traditional personal information such as addresses and social security numbers. Largely quantitative, 
these data are conversely easier for a machine to mine than the personal data the Codes of Fair 
Information Practice and their descendants were meant to address (Clarke, 2000). 
We begin this paper with an argument for how new principles can expand the Codes of Fair 
Information Practice to support privacy in cases of distributed, granular data sharing. We support 
this argument with a new architecture for mobile sensing: the Personal Data Stream. We have 
designed this architecture to restructure how data are stored and shared in mobile sensing, allowing 
for privacy principles to exist even in a distributed sharing environment. We enumerate these 
alternative privacy principles, as well as complementary policy and social changes needed to make 
this vision successful. We close with proposed next steps to evaluate the outcomes of our privacy 
principles and the supporting Personal Data Stream architecture.  
II. Expanding Codes of Fair Information Practice 
The Codes of Fair Information Practice offer a firm ethical and technical starting point for 
dealing with the personal data collected by mobile personal sensing. Participants in mobile sensing 
certainly deserve notice and awareness, choice and consent, access and participation, integrity and 
security, and enforcement and redress. But the distribution of these data beyond governments and 
large corporations complicates application of fair information principles. The Codes assume 
organizations to be the data collectors, and individuals to be the data subjects. This may not be the 
case in many mobile sensing applications. Consider the individual tracking his own weight loss 
statistics using an online application, or the community group that bands together to document 
pollution released by a chemical plant in the neighborhood. Individuals may intend their data 
collection for their own purposes and use. The data collected by community groups might be 
cooperatively analyzed and widely shared. By enabling dispersed data collection and sharing, mobile 
sensing collapses the role of data collectors and data subjects. Fair data practices begin to lose their 
coherency when the roles of data subjects and collectors become blurred. In these examples, which 
parties are responsible for ensuring notice, access, security and redress? 
One example of the blurring of institutions and individuals is the environmental application 
Ecorio, (http://www.ecorio.org/ecorio.htm). Much like PEIR, Ecorio collects activity and location 
                                                 
2 Examples of amateur and enthusiast data analysis and sharing are diverse. A sampling include “My Tracks,” 
http://mytracks.appspot.com/, Daytum, http://daytum.com/, Mycrocosm, http://mycro.media.mit.edu/, Moodstats, 
http://www.moodstats.com/, and Your.Flowingdata, http://your.flowingdata.com/.  
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data from users. The creators of this application describe themselves as “five guys from Ontario.” 
Ecorio offers little information as to what privacy measures it takes, or whether it adheres to 
professional data management standards such as the Codes of Fair Information Practice. This may 
be the result of disinterest in, or ignorance of, fair information practices. But it also could result 
from a lack of resources to devote to professional data management practices. The dispersed 
development of mobile sensing is an example of the deprofessionalization of information collection 
and protection (Braman, 2006) and the challenge that Zittrain (2008) refers to as “Privacy 2.0.” Data 
management codes developed for organizations, dependent upon best-practice security, and 
supervised by privacy officers become tenuous in a future where single developers or small teams 
create prolific data sharing applications. 
We define privacy as the process of controlling the flow of personal information (Westin, 
1970). In situations where individuals cannot be certain if their data are subject to Codes of Fair 
Information Practice, they lose control. Data they collect themselves, or data collected by small-scale 
applications, may not be protected by voluntary requirements for notice, consent, access, security 
and redress. Acquaintances, friends, employers or authorities might coerce disclosure of these 
sensitive data. Could a spouse or a boss compel an individual to turn over her mobile sensing data? 
Could these data be subpoenaed in a traffic accident or civil case? Even voluntary sharing can have 
unseen repercussions. Data shared with an acquaintance might reveal minor indiscretions, exposing 
little white lies about plans or social obligations. Or databases of locations and routines could be 
used to further segment and sort consumers, encouraging controversial forms of economic and 
social discrimination based on new demographic categories (Curry, Phillips, & Regan, 2004). At the 
extreme, mobile phones could collect data without participant consent, becoming the most 
widespread, embedded surveillance system in history. Consider the 2007 case of a New York City 
employee, fired after his boss tracked his GPS traces recorded by his work phone without his 
knowledge (Seifman, 2007). A second example: a pending case in the 3rd Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals questions whether the government can request phone location information from mobile 
providers without a warrant (Freiwald & Swire, 2009). Consumers who wish to use services like 
PEIR and Ecorio need a new set of privacy protections. 
Understanding privacy as a participatory process 
Loss of control over one’s personal data is heightened in mobile sensing because recording 
devices embedded in phones disrupt expected flows of information in both public and private 
spaces (Nissenbaum, 2004). In increasingly mediated environments, scholars such as Palen and 
Dourish (2003) suggest that privacy negotiation becomes a dynamic and ongoing process that relies 
heavily on user engagement with data and ongoing sense-making: which data am I sharing now, with 
whom, and what do they say about me? In mobile sensing, understanding privacy as engagement 
and control of data specifies that privacy decisions take place throughout the sensing process, from 
deciding to turn on a sensor to making post-facto decisions to delete data (Shilton, Burke, Estrin, 
Hansen, & Srivastava, 2008). Mobile sensing participants invested in their data will have reason to 
explore and make privacy decisions. PEIR participants, for example, can alter their carbon impact by 
varying their commuting routes, giving them reason to observe, play with, and interpret their data. 
We call this principle participant primacy. Participants should also be able to understand what the data 
mean and reveal about them. PEIR participants sharing commute data with coworkers might be 
concerned that the data document the time of day they enter and leave the workplace. We call this 
principle data legibility. Finally, participants should have the ability to make and revoke data sharing 
and withholding decisions over time, as the context of their privacy needs change. A PEIR 
participant may decide to stop tracking her location traces when a regular stop for medical treatment 
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becomes part of her commute. We call this principle longitudinal engagement. Each principle has roots 
in an individual right to manage one’s image and identity, and consequently the data that increasingly 
are part of that identity (Phillips, 2005).  
The Codes of Fair Information Practice do not support these principles well, because they 
do not adequately promote data subjects’ engagement with their own data. Notice is not enough to 
spark investment. Access is not enough to promote understanding. And redress is not enough to 
support long-term changes in context and subsequent privacy needs. We propose that participant 
primacy, data legibility and longitudinal engagement can expand the Codes of Fair Information 
Practice to support systems that improve users’ ability to make sense of, and regulate decisions to 
share or withhold, data. Individual decision-making about privacy is a complicated challenge, 
because individuals often suffer from incomplete information about data collection and limited 
understanding of consequences (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2008). But asymmetries in information and 
understanding can be at least partially eliminated by design choices that help illuminate data and 
support user decision-making. In this way, mobile personal sensing can support participatory privacy 
regulation: a privacy paradigm in which individuals gain back the ability to control their own data 
(Shilton et al., 2008). In a participatory approach to privacy, data management, discretion and 
sharing are integral parts of participation in sensing projects. To facilitate this engagement, we 
describe an architecture for enabling user decision-making about data collection and sharing, and the 
principles that undergird that architecture.  
Data types 
Mobile personal sensing is not a fixed set of practices, and it may be impossible to plan for 
all of the diverse data types such research might capture. But our experience designing applications 
and architectures for mobile sensing, and our interest in privacy issues, has led us to concentrate on 
three canonical, but not exclusive, types of data. These data types are location traces (created 
through tracking GPS points or cell tower triangulation over time), geotagged images, and geotagged 
text contributed by users. We concentrate on these three data types for several reasons. First, they 
are useful in current mobile sensing applications such as PEIR. Second, these emerging databases of 
geotagged data will likely grow increasingly popular and prevalent.3 Third, these types of data, when 
linked together or shared in large quantities, reveal individuals’ identity, routines, and preferences 
(Barkhuus & Dey, 2003; Curry et al., 2004; Kang & Cuff, 2005).   
III. Principles to Enable Participatory Privacy Regulation 
Design for primacy of participants  
We encourage the professional and amateur developers building location-aware applications 
to take a stronger stance than consent to data collection. Mobile sensing systems should enable 
participants to retain control over their raw data. Participants own their raw location data and any 
annotations to that data (photos, sound clips, co-location data, etc.) and are responsible for making 
and revoking decisions to share subsets of the data.4 Framed this way, participants are not just 
                                                 
3 Telecommunications providers increasingly have such databases, but the data is protected (with varying efficacy) by 
both U.S. law and the proprietary interests of the companies that have gathered the data (Mitrou, 2008). This data is, so 
far, not widely sharable or accessible, unlike mobile sensing data.  
4 Ownership of data has both legal and psychological dimensions. Although we support legal ownership of personal 
data, this is an emerging and unsettled policy question that we address in other work. Instead, we use “ownership” here 
in its psychological sense, to refer to the investment felt by individuals when they store, manage, and control their data.  
Participant primacy is meant to separate control of personal data from the interest of application developers.   
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subjects of data collection, but take the role of investigators (when they use self-analytic services) or 
co-investigators (when they contribute their data to larger research initiatives). This is the 
understanding of data collection developed and tested by Community-Based Participatory Research 
(CBPR) (Cargo & Mercer, 2008; Shallwani & Mohammed, 2007). CBPR successes in health and 
environmental research have not only increased the validity of research data, but also improved the 
ability of marginalized or underserved groups to act on the results of the data they have helped 
collect and analyze. CBPR traditions provide a model for distributed, bottom-up mobile sensing 
research. CBPR applied to mobile sensing gives participants an interest in how data are collected, 
processed, stored, and discarded. When users care about their data, and see them as theirs to manage 
and distribute, they redefine their relationship with data. Research in behavioral economics suggests 
that ownership may be a powerful motivator for individuals to engage in privacy decision-making 
(Acquisti & Grossklags, 2008). Data were once a commodity collected by corporations and 
governments. Now they are also an asset collected by individuals, community groups, or cooperative 
research projects. Like credit records, resumes, or social networking profiles, individuals who feel 
responsible for ownership of their data will have 
incentive to periodically review and manage those data.  
An architecture for primacy: the Personal Data Stream 
A new architecture for data collection and 
sharing can help to encourage participant primacy in 
mobile sensing. To facilitate ownership of data, 
individual participants need some of the same tools for 
storage and access control currently used by corporate 
data collectors. We have designed the Personal Data 
Stream (PDS) to give users new data management tools 
and enable them to cope with data privacy. In the 
current instantiation of PEIR (and many other location-
aware applications), location data flow directly from a 
user’s phone to the application servers. If users do not 
wish to share data with PEIR, they must remember to 
turn off the application on their phones, giving users 
only coarse and error-prone control of data capture. A 
Personal Data Stream-enabled PEIR will put more 
control of this sensitive data back in the hands of participants.  
The Personal Data Stream architecture consists of four parts. Specialized data collection 
software runs on mobile phones. It communicates with a Personal Data Vault (PDV), which is 
inserted between the user’s phone and third party applications. A set of filters in turn controls flow 
of the data from the vault to third party applications. Finally, third party application software accepts 
data from the vault, and communicates information such as data requirements and usage logs back 
to the vault.  
The vault lies at the center of the Personal Data Stream. The vault is a system of specialized 
software and decentralized hardware that provides storage, authentication, access control 
mechanisms, and a user interface. It resides between a user and an application, to give individuals an 
initial set of controls over when, and with whom, their location traces are shared. All data uploaded 
from a participant's phone first enter their vault. Functioning like a bank account or personal file 
storage, the vault becomes the place to check on and make decisions about data. Vaults could also 
work together or within an online social network to allow data sharing and joint analysis among 
Figure 1: The PDS imposes a data 
management tool between capture and third-
party analysis. Photo credit: Cat Deakins.
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informal groups (Hao et al., 2009). A number of research labs and commercial developers are 
building data gathering architectures that rely on a vault-like entity to provide trusted storage and 
processing. Complimentary designs include Stanford’s PRPL architecture (Lam, 2009) and AT&T 
Lab’s virtual individual servers (Cáceres, Cox, Lim, Shakimov, & Varshavsky, 2009), both of which 
are designed to support privacy in mobile sensing. The vault also has similarities to commercial 
developments for personal health records, such as Microsoft’s HealthVault (“Microsoft 
HealthVault,” n.d.) and Google Health (“Google Health,” n.d.). 
One set of vault-enabled decisions focus on whether, and with whom, to share data. Though 
the vault does not prevent the privacy problems associated with transmission or reuse by third 
parties, this new architecture does give users a first cut at managing data sharing.  The vault provides 
access control, allowing users to select and limit who can see what kinds of data. The PDV could 
default to keeping all data private as they arrive. Access control tables allow users to adjust these 
default policies, setting new sharing policies for particular third parties (individuals, groups, or 
applications such as PEIR). Users might also set policies according to time (e.g. only send PEIR data 
from 9am-5pm), geography (send only zipcode level data to PEIR), activity (share only driving 
routes with PEIR), or data type (share only geotagged photos with PEIR) (Hao et al., 2009). By 
giving users a variety of options for sharing their data, the PDV gives participants the ability to avoid 
total accountability for their locations and actions. For example, PEIR participants might share 
location data to take part in an office carbon reduction challenge. But to protect the details of their 
working hours, employees might send location traces stripped of time of day from their vaults to 
their employer.  
Beyond basic access control, the PDV could incorporate customized filters to help users 
manage the logistical burdens of selective sharing.  For example, an individual may wish to share 
only her usual routine with the (less secure) PEIR service. Filters within her PDV might detect 
anomalies in her routine (an unusual route, or an unprecedented trip late at night) and contact the 
user to ask if she wants to share the deviant trip with PEIR. The PDV could further protect data by 
incorporating location privacy measures. For applications that need less granular or accurate data 
than a GPS trace provides, the PDV could send coarser data, such as cell tower locations (Min Y. 
Mun, Estrin, Burke, & Hansen, 2008). The vault might take an even greater role in protecting 
individual’s data by supporting processing of the most sensitive data inside the vault. Instead of 
exporting a daily location trace to PEIR, for example, the PDV might perform the transformations 
PEIR requires directly on a user’s data. The PDV could then export only the results of those 
calculations, avoiding the security and privacy risks of sending location data to a third party 
application. Through authentication, access control, and privacy processing, the PDV is designed to 
keep users informed of, and in control over, who is using their data. It also minimizes the amount of 
data released to less-secure third party applications. Through these measures, the PDV will enable 
users to maintain a sense of ownership and control over their data.  
Design for data legibility  
Personal sensing systems can help participants make sense of, and decisions about, their data 
by visualizing granular, copious data in ways individuals can understand. Methods to improve data 
legibility include visualization tools such as maps, charts, icons, pictures, or scales. Data legibility also 
includes showing users who has accessed their data and how frequently, and showing participants 
where their data go and how long they remain accessible. Such system features increase participants’ 
understanding of complex risk and help them make better decisions about data capture, sharing, and 
retention. Legibility is a stronger interpretation of data access, and can fortify participants to be 
better data stewards.  
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Data visualization techniques have a rich history and are an ongoing topic of research and 
innovation in statistics, computer science, and design. Both PDVs and third-party applications will 
need to incorporate creative visualizations to help people understand their long-term data store. 
Natural language could also be a key to helping people understand what their data say about them. 
For instance, in the PEIR project, the algorithms that transform GPS data into impact and exposure 
numbers are translated into plain text, to help users understand how PEIR transforms their data 
(Figure 2).    
The PDV’s user interface will also play an important role in helping people understand and 
manage their data. A graphical interface that allows users to drag and drop data sets into specific 
privacy categories might ease the logistical burden of selecting new policies for every data set. In 
addition, the interface can not only help users set policies, but help them see the results of those 
policies. Illustrating who can see what data will go a long way towards helping users understand the 
consequences of data sharing. 
A more detailed 
way to help users 
interpret their data and 
make privacy decisions 
would be to include a 
set of inference agents 
within the Personal 
Data Vault.  Basic 
agents might keep track 
of who had access to 
what data from the 
vault, and give the user 
easy-to-read reports 
about what each friend 
or third-party 
application learns about 
her. An advanced agent 
could scour the web or 
third-party applications 
for personal data about 
an individual, and make 
a series of inferences from that data. By checking on the inferences the agent is able to make, 
individuals would have an enhanced idea of what the data they share reveal about them. Algorithms 
to support such inferences are still under development, and remain a challenge for PDV developers 
(Hao et al., 2009). 
Design for longitudinal engagement  
The interfaces of both the PDV and mobile sensing applications should encourage 
participants to engage with their data from the point of collection through analysis, long-term 
retention, or deletion. Privacy decisions about sharing and retaining data are part of the sensing 
process, and can occur at many points in a sensing project. System features to encourage the 
continued engagement of participants can allow them to change their data practices as their context 
changes. Stronger than notice, the crux of engaging individuals with decisions about their data is 
Figure 2: Natural language explanations of algorithmic processes
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refusing to put data in a black box. Instead, collecting high-quality data, learning from the data, and 
making ongoing choices about the data throughout their lifecycle become the goals of sensing.  
The Personal Data Stream architecture can encourage long-term interaction with data in a 
variety of ways. The mobile phone represents the capture point and therefore the beginning of the 
data life cycle. Data collection clients designed for the phone should therefore have clear signifiers 
of data capture, and give the user easy options for turning capture on and off (Bellotti & Sellen, 
1993). Once data have reached the PDV, design features can encourage users to visit the vault 
regularly to check on their data. Features employed by commercial sites, such as weekly email 
updates with data sharing summaries, or monthly reminders (or requirements) that users review their 
sharing policies, might be useful to encourage regular data check-ups. And as users allow vault 
access to new friends and applications, or join groups that pool data, they will need to revisit and 
update their sharing policies, creating an additional incentive for longitudinal engagement.  
Feedback has also been demonstrated as critical to privacy decision-making (Tsai et al., 
2009). Users who receive feedback on who has viewed their data, and how frequently, can update 
their sharing decisions should they become uncomfortable with an individual’s level of access. They 
can similarly make decisions and alter sharing if they see that an application has passed their data on 
to another party. PEIR users, for example, may see notifications when their zip code-level data are 
shared with regional Air Quality Management Districts to obtain pollution exposure estimates. In 
this way, auditing can provide users with accountability for how their data are used (Weitzner et al., 
2008). The Personal Data Vault can host audit mechanisms to enable users to monitor and adjust 
data sharing as their interests and context changes. This could be as simple as logs that reflect what 
data the vault has sent to third party applications. A PDV inference agent could also check and 
report on the vault data an outside party already has access to, helping users make a more informed 
decision about sharing with that party.  
A more complete form of feedback could take the form of a “TraceAudit”: a trail of data use 
and sharing outside the vault, modeled after an internet traceroute (“Traceroute,” 2009).5 Such a 
mechanism would begin to address participants’ lack of control once their data have left the 
Personal Data Vault (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009). This would require third party applications to 
log sharing or transformation of data back to the PDV, according to terms agreed upon when an 
individual (or the PDV on her behalf) contracts with the application. Audit mechanisms like the 
TraceAudit might go so far as to require accountability for data use from third party applications. A 
third party auditor or periodic certification of third parties is perhaps an even stricter 
implementation of accountability for longitudinal engagement.  
IV. Social and Policy Changes 
Designing for participant primacy, legibility, and longitudinal engagement will shape the 
Personal Data Stream architecture, but technical decisions will not be enough to ensure the success 
of participatory privacy regulation. Focus on participant investment and legible, changeable systems 
will help people make more informed decisions about withholding and sharing information. But 
informing participants is not enough to ensure sufficient data privacy.  Individuals’ privacy decisions 
are often less than rational (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2008). Mobile sensing participants may make 
disclosure decisions based on a host of structural and contextual factors, ranging from whether 
making privacy changes is easy and intuitive, to knowing what privacy decisions their friends and 
colleagues are making. To enlarge the privacy protection discussion beyond individual decision-
making, supporting social structures can fortify participant engagement with the Personal Data 
                                                 
5 The traceroute is a tool used to map the path of packets as they move through a network.  
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Stream and the protection of data privacy. These include public discussion and debate to improve 
data literacy, increasing the transparency of third party data practices, and securing a trade secrets-
like legal privilege for raw sensing data. 
Public discussion and debate  
Developing a lay public understanding of mobile sensing privacy, security and risk is critical 
to a vision of participatory privacy regulation. But casual technology users often underestimate or 
misunderstand data sharing and security risks (Camp, Asgharpour, Liu, & Bloomington, 2007). Data 
literacy will become an increasingly important knowledge set as applications for collecting and 
sharing data proliferate.  
Developers can engage traditional media, new media, educators, and civic groups to get 
citizens interested in, and talking about, mobile sensing. This will help to move discussion of privacy 
decision-making into the public sphere. Public discussion and debate of social issues engendered in 
mobile sensing technologies can fortify both individual understanding and democratic decision-
making. It can also subject sensing systems to both academic and lay reflection and critique 
(Calhoun, 2000). This debate might take place in the popular media, or increasingly within online 
settings and communities of interest (Kelty, 2008). This is a space of debate, discourse, and 
consensus building, and makes privacy about more than just individual choice. The recent furor over 
Facebook’s terms of use (and before that, the site’s Beacon and news feed features) are examples of 
ways the public sphere can discuss, comment on, and affect privacy issues (Stone & Stelter, 2009). 
By hosting discussion boards on mobile sensing services such as PEIR, by commenting on blogs 
and joining debates in city councils, by reading and critiquing popular press accounts, both sensing 
designers and participants can contribute to discussion about protecting and sharing location data.  
Transparency of services  
Helping individuals understand the data practices of mobile sensing services to which they 
subscribe will help participants make better sharing decisions. A voluntary or regulated system of 
application labels would help participants understand levels of risk inherent in location-aware 
services. If an application has “best practice” data practices, it might be certified as a ‘fair data’ 
application. In much the same way that voluntary and regulated labels such as ‘fair trade’ and 
‘organic’ increase the transparency of food products for consumers, labeling can help individuals 
contract with trusted service providers. Best practices might start with the Codes of Fair 
Information Practice, and grow to include anonymizing data when possible (Cheng & Prabhakar, 
2004; Horey, Groat, Forrest, & Esponda, 2007), collecting minimal information (Agre, 1994), 
visualizing and explaining data analysis and aggregation procedures, and supporting audit trails 
(Weitzner et al., 2008) and data retention limits (Bannon, 2006; Blanchette & Johnson, 2002; Dodge 
& Kitchin, 2007). 
Legal privilege for raw location data 
Finally, a legal evidentiary privilege similar to the one commonly recognized for trade secrets 
must be created to protect mobile sensing data. If individuals and groups are to explore their world 
with new sensing tools, they should not be threatened by the potential negative consequences of 
capturing accurate information about themselves. If raw location data is too easily discoverable in 
civil litigation, individuals or entire demographics might be dissuaded from participation in this new 
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form of investigation. A qualified privilege modeled after the trade secrets privilege strikes a good 
balance of protecting this sensitive data from casual and unnecessary disclosure.6   
Participatory privacy regulation in practice 
What does the Personal Data Stream architecture, bolstered by these principles and 
structures, look like in practice? Consider the example below.  
Maya is a participant in PEIR. PEIR uses Maya’s time-location series to infer 
how much she drives and whether she spends time near polluted highways. Maya 
heard about PEIR from a friend, and checked out the PEIR website. She was happy 
to discover that PEIR is a ‘fair data’ service provider. She knows this means they will 
not keep her location data for more than a year and they will not share them with 
third parties. She also notices that PEIR hosts lively discussion forums about 
everything from reducing carbon impact to privacy issues. PEIR gathers participant 
suggestions and iterates on the service based on user input to these forums. Maya 
decides she feels comfortable trying PEIR, and agrees to let her Personal Data Vault 
release her location information to PEIR every day between 7:30 am (when she 
typically leaves home) and 6:30 pm (when she arrives back home).  
When Maya logs onto PEIR at the end of her day, she can see a map 
illustrating all of her driving trips and periods of inactivity throughout the day. She 
can see what time she arrived at work, her trip to the doctor’s office, and her quick 
stop at the liquor store. The PEIR map encourages her to click on each trip to learn 
more about conditions (such as time spent idling) that raised her carbon impact. As 
she clicks on each trip, she is reminded that she is sharing these data with PEIR. She 
also thinks about whether she is comfortable sharing each trip with a group of 
friends. She decides to share her commute, but not her trip to the doctor, with her 
‘Friend Map.’ She has already added her partner and a few coworkers to her Friend 
Map, and can see how impact and exposure compare to those of people she knows.  
As she reviews her maps and daily impact, she decides to delete that trip to the liquor 
store from PEIR’s database.  
The next morning, one of Maya’s favorite blogs posts an article on location 
privacy and the dangers of creating an archive of personal location data. Maya reads 
the article and is inspired to comment on the blog about her experience using PEIR. 
Maya knows the data in her Personal Data Vault is secure and free from the risk of 
subpoena. But PEIR is less secure. She weighs the blog’s arguments and chooses to 
continue using PEIR for the near future. She decides, however, that she may delete 
all of the data in her PEIR account after a few months of use.  
V. Future Work 
Technical innovations in designing and securing the Personal Data Vault, improving data 
interpretation through user interfaces, and constructing auditing methods will be important to the 
success of participatory privacy regulation. We have also identified several areas with unsolved 
                                                 
6 The Federal Rules of Evidence did not adopt an explicit trade secrete privilege rule.  However, in practice, some such 
privilege has been recognized in federal and state courts as a matter of common law, or in certain states by its rules of 
evidence.   See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1060 (2009) (“If he or his agent or employee claims the privilege, the owner of a 
trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of 
the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”)  For a more detailed argument for a legal 
privilege for mobile sensing data, see Kang, Burke, Estrin, Hansen, & Shilton, under development. 
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technical, legal and social challenges. Addressing these areas will be necessary to ensure that 
individuals can fully participate in privacy decision-making.  
Creating a business model for the data vault that does not rely on mining location data is a 
central unmet challenge. Perhaps data vaults could be hosted by universities or nonprofits, or 
alternately tied to existing enterprises such as banks. Developing a financial infrastructure to support 
vigorous development and use of PDVs is necessary before a vision of participatory privacy 
regulation can be realized. Another challenge will be defining ‘fair data’ best practices for third party 
applications. Best practices for ubiquitous computing suggested by scholars include design to draw 
awareness to, and increase accountability of, capture systems (Bellotti & Sellen, 1993; Langheinrich, 
2002), methods to enable ubiquitous computing systems to allow for multiple identities and 
pseudonomy (Phillips, 2002, 2005), techniques and recommendations for privacy-sensitive design 
(Camp & Connelly, 2008; Iachello, Smith, Consolvo, Chen, & Abowd, 2005; Kang & Cuff, 2005), 
and trusted architectures to protect personal information (Cáceres et al., 2009; Hong & Landay, 
2004). Much as the process convened to establish the Codes of Fair Information Practice took 
negotiation between diverse experts (Waldo et al., 2007), discussion and debate will determine 
appropriate definitions for ‘fair data’ requirements. A final challenge is the social measures necessary 
to encourage broad data and location privacy literacy. Helping individuals or groups understand the 
importance of data privacy, as well as the possibilities of sharing, may become as important as 
financial literacy. Individuals may also need guidance in seeking redress for breaches of data sharing 
licenses and contracts with third party applications.  
Outcomes of participatory privacy regulation and the Personal Data Stream architecture, and 
indicators of its success, will be important to understanding the ability of the principles we have 
described to tackle information privacy in a distributed datascape. There are numerous ways 
researchers could document improvements in the environment in which personal sensing 
participants make privacy decisions. We describe a few possibilities below. 
Documenting participant satisfaction  
Our ongoing research will begin analyzing the success of participatory privacy regulation 
measures by undertaking interviews with, and observations of, participants in mobile sensing. These 
qualitative data will gauge participants’ level of engagement in, and satisfaction with, sensing research 
and privacy decision-making. Qualitative data can suggest answers to contextual questions about 
when and why participants make decisions to share or withhold data. Interviews with participants 
can elicit how participants feel while interacting with sensing systems and how much participants 
trust the systems. Interviews can also establish whether participants engage in a broader debate 
about privacy with people they know or in public spaces. Direct observation of participants during 
the course of data collection and data analysis can also provide clues to when and why participants 
feel boundary or identity sensitivities, and whether participatory privacy regulation principles 
adequately address these sensitivities. Explicit participant critique of our design methods and 
software can help us understand whether our systems make data legible and fortify participants in 
the ways our principles intend. But because interviews are time consuming to perform and analyze, 
the sample of mobile sensing participants interviewed will necessarily be small.  
Documenting participant engagement 
To bolster the small sample that we can effectively interview, we can add quantitative use 
statistics drawn from the Personal Data Vault and third party applications such as PEIR. How 
frequently do users take advantage of privacy features from data deletion to ‘fair data’ certification 
labels? With participant permission and even participation, we can analyze logs detailing use of 
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existing software to evaluate how frequently and under what conditions participants engage in 
existing privacy processes such as changing data resolution, sharing selectively, and deleting. We can 
compare individual’s privacy actions to their degree of involvement, measured according to amount 
of data gathered, and length and frequency of involvement in data gathering. These quantitative data 
will indicate whether and how engagement correlates with sharing and discretion decisions. 
Considering cognitive outcomes  
Future research could also take a psychological approach to measuring participants’ 
understanding of, and engagement in, privacy regulation. Do participants understand the flow of 
their data through the vault architecture and third party systems? Do they understand privacy risks? 
Can legibility measures such as data visualization or inference agents improve individual cognition of 
risk? Psychological measurements of understanding of these concepts might help us understand 
whether our efforts have fortified the decision-making skills of sensing participants. 
VI. Conclusion 
Mobile sensing provides the ability to bring individuals and groups into research on a 
massive scale, opening up data collection and participation in data analysis by taking advantage of 
mobile phones, tools widely adopted across the world. Applying this broad notion of participation 
directly to privacy can help to mitigate some of the invasive aspects of this vision. This paper has 
described what participating in privacy might entail, and described a system architecture and set of 
social structures that might enable such participation. Through this process, we hope to build mobile 
sensing technologies that reflect a vision for data privacy as a continual, engaged process of 
discretion and disclosure according to context. By creating systems that enable interaction and data 
flow control, mobile sensing can enable meaningful, workable information privacy.  
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